

"The Limits of Individualism: Dependence, Suffering, and Community"

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ABSTRACTS

Maria Altepeter, "The Body of Christ and The Principle of Totality: A Case for Intercommunion"

Abstract: Current Canon Law of the Catholic Church absolutely prohibits Catholics from receiving communion at Protestant services where such communities lack valid sacraments. The Catholic Church reasoning for this is that where there is not full ecclesial and doctrinal unity, there can be no Eucharistic sharing. I will argue that this reason is inconsistent with other statements made in Canon Law of the Catholic Church, and so I will put forth an alternative reason the Catholic Church has for its prohibitions and permissions on intercommunion. From this, I will argue that, since "all who have been justified by faith in Baptism are members of Christ's body," by the Principle of Totality, separating members of the Body of Christ is warranted only when the unity of the Body of Christ is otherwise threatened. Since, I will argue, these threats to the Body of Christ can be avoided without necessarily refraining from (at least some instances of) intercommunion, such absolute prohibitions ought to be therefore reconsidered.

Alina Beary, "Why We Need Moral Virtues: A Thomistic Solution to an Aristotelian Puzzle"

Abstract: There exists a tension within the Aristotelian account of human happiness. Aristotle argues that the perfect human life is constituted by philosophical contemplation and that such life is supported by intellectual - not moral – virtues. He also argues that moral virtues are not necessary for the possession of intellectual virtues. Why, then, should we cultivate moral virtues? In this paper, I begin to construct a Thomistic solution to this puzzle. Due to the time constraints, I won't be able to give a full explanation of Aquinas's nuanced account of the relationship between theological virtues, acquired moral virtues, and the latter's infused counterparts. The main goal of this paper is to motivate the question of whether acquired moral virtues are necessary, and to show that

Aquinas's answer to this question hinges on Aquinas's reinterpretation of the Aristotelian account of eudaimonia. To this end, I first explicate the tension within the Aristotelian account and show how Aquinas resolves it by transforming the Aristotelian eudaimonia into an imperfect/natural happiness that, nevertheless, provides us with the glimpses of our ultimate/supernatural happiness. I then sketch an explanation of the roles that infused and acquired moral virtues play in orienting us rightly toward our ultimate end.

Craig Boyd, "From Vulgar Conceit to Ennobled Humility: The Thomistic Moral Journey of Master Samwise"

Abstract: The vices seem to receive much more publicity and attention than the virtues because they seem to be—at least as portrayed in popular culture and literature—more interesting than the virtues. And even though wisdom and courage seem to get some attention, other virtues like compassion and humility—due to their unobtrusive nature—get little notice at all. For humility, this may be due to the fact that in the Christian tradition thinkers such as Benedict, Augustine, and Aquinas see the humble person as an individual who lives “close to the ground.” Aquinas says, “As Isidore says, ‘a humble person is so called because that person is, as it were, ‘homo acclinis,’ i.e. inclined to the lowest place.” That is, a person who possesses humility is a person who is literally “well-grounded.” We should expect, then, that the humble person’s character will largely go unnoticed by those not paying close attention.

Very few characters in literature successfully capture the humble person’s disposition with the notable exception of Tolkien’s humble hobbit, Sam Gamgee. In this paper, I argue that the way Tolkien portrays Sam Gamgee demonstrates a Thomistic account of humility; and although Sam initially exhibits typical hobbit conceit, by the end of the narrative he has developed a stable disposition and demonstrates the redemptive possibilities of humility.

Nik Breiner, "Penal Substitution But Not Substitutionary Punishment: Aquinas on the Atonement"

Abstract: "I consider Aquinas' account of the atonement, focusing on his claim that Christ “bears our punishment” for us, in our place. I note that while Aquinas rejects that God punishes Jesus, he nonetheless holds that Jesus substitutionally fulfills for us justice’s requirement that sin be penalized. Thus, Aquinas’ account calls for a distinction between ‘penal substitution’ and ‘substitutionary punishment,’ a distinction relevant to contemporary criticisms of penal substitution theory."

Anna Brinkerhoff, "What’s Really Problematic about Problematic Irrelevant Influences"

Abstract: An irrelevant influence is something that influences your credence in p but does not bear on the truth of p. These types of influences are pervasive, and raise pressing concerns for religious believers. In a recent paper, Katia Vavova contends that only some irrelevant influences are problematic and call for doxastic revision. She thinks that we can figure out which irrelevant influences are problematic by looking to the Good Independence Reason Principle (GIRP): to the

extent that you have good independent reason to think that you are mistaken with respect to p, you must revise your credence in p accordingly—insofar as you can.

In this paper, I argue against GIRP, and offer a better alternative to it. Specifically, I argue that GIRP gives the wrong verdict in certain cases of irrelevant influences – I call them double-higher-order (double-HOE) cases. I argue that GIRP requires that agents in double-HOE cases reduce their credence in p when they shouldn't. Upon rejecting GIRP, I advance a finer-grained version of it called Inaccurate-GIRP and suggest that we accept Inaccurate-GIRP as our guide to distinguishing between problematic and unproblematic irrelevant influences.

Graham Brown, "The Political Reconciliation of Groups: A Biblical and Philosophical Analysis"

Abstract: This paper analyzes the political principles that should govern the reconciliation of groups that come into contact with one another where one group already occupies a territory onto which newcomers arrive. It is first suggested that the biblical account of the Promised Land and Conquest of Canaan contains important political principles relevant to the issue. The paper then examines whether there are good reasons to apply these principles to the contemporary discussion in post-colonial nation states about the meaning and nature of the reconciliation of Indigenous groups with the sovereignty that was asserted over them by European newcomers. It is argued that neither the bible nor political theory support the thesis of Aboriginal Originalism of a right to unfettered self-determination; rather, those two sources of principles support the reconciliation of Indigenous and newcomers through forming a new political society governed by a sovereignty arrangement that protects the right to enjoyment of culture, generously understood, and that to refuse to embrace the formation of such a society is to refuse to reconcile. By embracing liberal principles Indigenous groups submit not to the preferences of an alien legal culture, but embrace principles that protect their enjoyment, and therefore preservation, of culture.

Christopher Callaway, "Is Epistemic Peerhood Transitive? A Problem for Conciliationism"

Abstract: Much of the literature on peer disagreement has considered disagreement arising between only two persons. However, I argue here that adding a third person to the analysis potentially raises a problem for those who hold that peer disagreement should lead one to change one's view. I first explain typical cases of disagreement between two persons and the two main positions that have been taken in the literature regarding such disagreement. I then change the analysis to involve a third person whose peerhood is under dispute by the original two, and I argue that conciliationists, to be consistent with their own position, should accept that the belief of this third person also has significance even for the original peer who did not think that the third person was a peer. If so, then peerhood is transitive: the peer of my peer is also my peer. I then argue that this transitivity has counterintuitive implications which will be problematic for conciliationism.

Nevin Climenhaga and Daniel Rubio, "Divine Providence and Human Freedom"

Abstract: Molinists are libertarians who think that there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs), and that God knows what they are prior to creation. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if there were true CCFs, libertarian free will would be impossible. More precisely,

suppose the following CCF is true prior to creation: if Eve were tempted in the garden, she would sin. Let “the Circumstances” refer to the truth of this CCF’s antecedent. We argue as follows:

- (1) The CCF and Circumstances fully explain Eve’s action.
- (2) Neither Eve nor anything Eve does (even partially) explains the CCF or the Circumstances.
- (3) If incompatibilism is true, then if X fully explains the fact that S φ -s, and neither S nor anything S does even partially explains the truth of X, S does not freely φ .
- (4) Eve does not freely sin. [from (1)-(3)]

We show that (1) and (2) follow from the most natural way of representing the explanatory relations the Molinist is committed to, combined with very weak assumptions about explanation (such as that it is asymmetric). We then argue, by appeal to well-known cases in the free will debate, that the libertarian is committed to (3)

Emmanuel Cumplido, "The Univocal Predication of Being in John Duns Scotus: A Reply to Harris on Aquinas"

Abstract: Duns Scotus’ theory of the univocity of being and Aquinas’ analogia entis are tirelessly invoked in a perennial debate concerning religious language: can any terms be predicated univocally between God and the world? I will argue, in two parts, that Scotus’ position contains resources for resisting at least two recent arguments for the analogia entis. First, Scotus’ theory of univocity will be related to his semantics and metaphysics via its’ application to Aristotle’s categories. Second, I will employ this theory in response to two recent arguments by Joshua Lee Harris made in defense of Aquinas against William Alston. The first is that the relationship between God and creatures is analogical to generic univocity. I will respond that the creaturely relationship analogical to the God-creature relationship is in fact a different relationship that Scotus undermines. The second is that neither being nor transcendental perfections can be univocal because neither belong to a genus. However, Scotus’ theory does not depend on such external differentiation. If the reading of Scotus’ theory in part one is cogent, and the rebuttal to Aquinas and Harris is forceful, this paper serves as an argument furthering Alston’s bid for a theory of univocal predication.

Ravit Dotan, "Resilience in the face of counter-evidence in Religion and Science"

Abstract: It has been argued that resilience in the face of counter-evidence is an important component of faith (for example: Buchak (2017), Howard-Snyder (2013), Pace (MS), and Wolterstorff (1990)). I will defend this view by demonstrating how resilience may take place and I will argue that similar resilience takes place in science. However, it seems important that sometimes agents won’t be resilient. This gives rise to a puzzle: how can agents be both resilient in the face of and sensitive to counter-evidence? I respond to this puzzle using Buchak’s risky commitment account of faith, and argue that the cost of using this account is that agents’ beliefs, whether scientific or religious, are inherently shaped by pragmatic and subjective considerations.

Robert Frazier, "Pascal's Two Sources of Sin: Acedia and Pride's Challenge to Optimistic Epistemic Individualism"

Abstract: In this paper, I explore Pascal's contention that self-deception is the plight of fallen humans and that there are two sources of sin, acedia and pride, which sustain it. I take this to be a challenge to the epistemic optimism of the 17th century in Europe even in the face of the rise of Pyrrhonism with Montaigne. Pascal was critical of this optimism as evidenced by his criticisms of Descartes and the Stoics throughout the *Pensees* and in his *Discussion with Monsieur de Sacy*. I engage in a brief exegesis of three main passages in Pascal that establish pride and sloth as the two sources of sin and vice. I suggest this is the result of failing to understand the dual nature of the post-lapsarian self. Humans exist in the dialectic of greatness and wretchedness. To only consider greatness leads to pride; to concentrate on weakness leads to acedia and despair. I contend that acedia is an aversion to care and for truth. Given Pascal's Augustinism, I offer an account of Augustine on pride by examining passages from various sources. The last section explores the political and social applications to the emergent political individualism of the day.

Audra Goodnight, "Dependence, Disability, and Second-Person Relations"

Abstract: In *The Second-Person Standpoint*, Stephen Darwall argues for a second-personal account of morality. In his view, only persons who have the authority and competency to address second-person demands on others are included in the second-person standpoint. Two initial worries surface from Darwall's account. First, the role and nature of second-person relations is unclear. Second, the requirements for making and receiving second-personal moral claims are too demanding, and subsequently exclude various persons from participating in the second-person standpoint, such as children or disabled persons. In response, I offer two routes by which to reconceive the nature of second-person relations in order to preserve their role in morality. The first route rearticulates the notion of address by focusing on a form of communication as connection. The second route considers the experiential role of presence, openness and human interdependency in second-person relations. Ultimately, I argue for a different conception of second-person relations that acknowledges human interdependency, vulnerability, and need within the moral framework.

Samuel Hall, "The Function of Trust as a Cognitive Attitude"

Abstract: Recent philosophical interest in trust has focused predominantly on the ethical and epistemological analysis of interpersonal trust. This paper explores the less developed task of discerning what cognitive attitude might be operative within interpersonal trust relations in an attempt to better unify the wider philosophical discussion of trust. I begin by proposing the notion of 'trust' as a distinct cognitive attitude available to take toward propositions, distinguishing it from the alternative attitudes of 'belief' and 'acceptance' through a first consideration of their differing ends and particular roles within theoretical and practical reasoning. I then develop a descriptive, functional account of 'trust' as 'voluntarily premising as true with a commitment to future verification' in light of the epistemic aim of disclosing truth. The plausibility of this framework for understanding 'trust' is further supported by demonstrating its ability to offer a compatible model of interpersonal trust centered on the effective fulfillment of shared ends. This model is capable of both accommodating widely acknowledged characteristics of trust and resolving certain puzzles

regarding the nature of trust. I conclude by indicating the viability of my account as a potential source of further insights for areas of philosophical interest beyond merely trust.

Erik Hanson, "Evil, Sin, and Guilt in Augustine and Kierkegaard"

Abstract: Discussions of Saint Augustine's account of moral evil traditionally arise within the context of contemporary interpretations of his "Free Will Defense" (where hereditary sin plays an essential role, e.g., Plantinga's "trans-world depravity"). However this paper focuses more narrowly on Søren Kierkegaard's commitment to autonomy and moral rigorism insofar as it is debilitated by the Augustinian account of hereditary sin, which he rejects. Yet Kierkegaard's defense of human freedom and moral responsibility also requires that he also avoid Pelagianism, a task that he takes up in *The Concept of Anxiety*. He thereby presents an alternative account of the origin of evil to that of Augustine in which its source is found in a morally neutral anxiety propelled by a consciousness of ignorance and possibility in the face of a divine prohibition. Kierkegaard effectively upends and presents an alternative to the Augustinian explanation for the origin and persistence of evil. In spite of his challenge to Augustine's account of hereditary sin, Kierkegaard retains a commitment to the Augustinian account of both the nature of evil and human freedom in *The Sickness Unto Death* offering an existential account of Augustinian *privatio boni* as despair.

Joseph Jedwab and John A. Keller, "Paraphrase and the Doctrine of the Trinity"

Abstract: We argue in this paper that every solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity must, at least implicitly, make use of the technique of paraphrase: reformulating a claim in a more logically or metaphysically perspicuous manner. If this is correct, explicit thought and discussion about paraphrase deserve more prominence in the literature on the Doctrine of the Trinity. We show that there are some unnoticed or underappreciated puzzles facing standard "solutions" to the Logical Problem of the Trinity—Relative Identity Theory, Latin Trinitarianism, and Social Trinitarianism—that come to light when those solutions are viewed as, in part, proposals for how to paraphrase the Doctrine.

Chris King, "The Account of Sociality and Critique of Idealism in Bonhoeffer's *Sanctorum Communio*"

Abstract: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's account of sociality in *Sanctorum Communio* has been misunderstood not only because of its complexity but also because Bonhoeffer's presentation of how various the elements of sociality ought to be related to one another is not clearly laid out. In this paper, I show how Bonhoeffer offers distinctive layers of what he calls social-basic relations [*soziale Grundbeziehungs-begriffen*] to account for human sociality, in contrast to what he considers to be the failure of German idealist models of social life. Bonhoeffer's ultimate aim is to give an account of the sociality of the church, both in its empirical structures and in its underlying ontological framework. In the course of articulating the different social-basic relations that are operative in the primal state, after the fall into sin, and in the church, Bonhoeffer offers five interrelated criticisms of idealism which his model of sociality serves to correct. Bonhoeffer's model

of sociality, then, articulates itself a solution to the failures of idealism which he lays out in his dissertation.

Paul Macdonald, "The Theological Virtue of Hope and the Practical Problem of Evil"

Abstract: In this paper, working from a distinctly Christian perspective, I address the practical "problem" or challenge that the existence of evil poses. Traditional Christians believe in a God who is both able and willing to bring good out of evil, and turn the evil that they participate in (suffer and do) into their ultimate good, which is eternal life with God in heaven. Moreover, Christians possess the theological virtue of hope, which enables them fully to rely on (or trust in, lean on) God in order to bring about their ultimate good out of all of the evil in which they participate. I spend the bulk of the paper, then, showing how Christians, as possessors of the theological virtue of hope, are fully equipped to confront or respond successfully to all of the evil in which they participate, since by the power of God's grace they are able to rely fully on God (who is perfect in power, goodness, and mercy) to redeem (or defeat) such evil, converting it to their ultimate good. I also briefly discuss how it is possible for the Christian to hope that God will redeem all of the evil in which (potentially all) others participate.

Blake McAllister, "Faith and the Justification of Christian Belief"

Abstract: I assume that faith in a person partially consists in taking on a certain perspective—in possessing a lasting, formative disposition for things to seem as though the object of faith is worthy of one's trust. I then articulate three main ways in which the perspective of faith can generate support for the trustworthiness (and thus existence) of God. An important upshot is that discussions about the justification of religious belief—including debates about, for example, whether observed patterns of evil and suffering constitute decisive evidence against God's existence—need to take into account the individual perspectives of each subject.

Andrew Moon, "The Sensus Divinitatis, Clairvoyance, and the Role of Community in Warranted Belief"

Abstract: On Alvin Plantinga's (2000) view, if Sally's beliefs about God are formed by a reliable, truth-aimed, properly functioning *sensus divinitatis* in the appropriate environment, then the belief is warranted. In this paper, I raise the question of how Sally differs from Laurence Bonjour's (1980) Norman, who believes that the president is in New York by way of a reliable clairvoyance faculty, and whose belief seems unwarranted. To answer this question, I first explain, in section 2, why Norman's belief seems unwarranted. This allows me to explain, in section 3, how the various ways we fill in the details of the case of Sally will determine whether her belief is epistemically analogous to Norman's. A crucial detail will be Sally's background beliefs about whether others in her community have the ability to know God.

Joshua Mugg, "Faith and Doubt at the Cry of Dereliction: A Defense of the Belief-Plus Model"

Abstract: The belief-plus model (or the 'common view', as Howard-Snyder calls it) states that faith that p requires belief that p, though belief is not sufficient for faith. This view has recently come under fire within analytic philosophy of religion. In this paper, I focus on one recent argument from Beth Rath (2017), who argues that Christ's cry of dereliction provides a counterexample to the belief-plus model. At the time of the cry, Christ was in doubt about whether God was with him. However, he did not lose his faith. Thus, the belief-plus model is false. I defend the belief plus model. I begin by outlining a related argument against the belief-plus model: the argument from doubt, and, following Malcolm and Smith (forthcoming) distinguish between three types of doubt. I then turn to Rath's argument, arguing that her key premise—that Christ had faith that God was with him—at best, begs the question. I then provide two arguments that this premise is false. Christ did lose his faith that God was present with him at the time of the cry, but did not lose his faith regarding a host of related propositions.

Clinton Neptune, "Defending Heaven's Desirability"

Abstract: Bernard Williams famously argued that immortality would lead to intolerable tedium. If his conclusion is true, then we ought not desire any sort of blissful-type afterlife (heaven) that precludes death. I will argue in this paper that Williams' argument, while valid, has several objectionable premises. The first premise, that there are only a finite number of pleasurable activities, does not account for the logically possible and popular Christian vision of an afterlife where denizens have a "resurrection body" that may be capable of unique and limitless activity kinds. The second premise, that every activity eventually becomes unyieldingly boring, fails to account for some highly plausible inexhaustible pleasures such as raising children, loving relationships, and knowledge of God. The third and fourth premises trade on the notion that an existence of unyielding boredom is less desirable than ceasing to exist, an idea that demands agnosticism given our inability to evaluate the phenomenal quality of non-existent. These objections and others showcase that Williams' argument is not persuasive and it is reasonable to reject the conclusion that heaven is necessarily undesirable.

Michelle Panchuk, "Toward a Liturgy of Protest"

Abstract: This paper argues that incorporating lament and protest directed toward God into the corporate liturgies of the Christian church is a means of fulfilling the two great commandments to love God and to love one's neighbor. I first demonstrate liturgy's dual potential to re-traumatize or to empower spiritual trauma survivors. I then consider Biblical examples of protest, and argue drawing on Micheal Rea's work, that for people with deeply conflict relationships with God, such a spiritual trauma survivors, it can be a means of expressing faith in God, however small. In the third section I suggest that Nancy Penida-Madrid's social-suffering hermeneutic reveals the demands that spiritual trauma makes on religious communities as a whole, and examine how liturgical protest might meet them. Finally, I argue that protest can be a mechanism by which the religious community stands in repentant solidarity with oppressors and empathetic solidarity with the oppressed. Thus, it is a means of expressing love of all our neighbors, both the oppressed and their oppressors.

Adam Pelsler, "Cultivating Christian Love in Community"

Abstract: Christian wisdom has long taught that we sinful humans do not come by Christian love (charity) naturally, but that it must be infused in our hearts by a gracious, creative, loving act of God. In what sense, then, can we do anything to cultivate the virtue of Christian love, aside from praying that God would infuse us with it? One answer, proposed by Soren Kierkegaard, is that while the foundation of Christian love must initially be laid in our hearts by God, love can (and perhaps must) be “built up” in the context of Christian community. In this paper, I develop and expand on Kierkegaard’s proposal. Although God must initially plant the seeds of love in our hearts, Christians can help to cultivate God’s love in each other by “presupposing love” in each other’s hearts and by engaging in communal practices that remind each other of God’s great love for us in Christ.

Claire Peterson, "Pride in Perfection? A Thomistic Defense of Wesley's Entire Sanctification"

Abstract: Within Christian theology, sanctification is understood as the process by which God works in believers to make them holy. According to John Wesley (among others), this process sometimes results in people who, prior to death, are so transformed that they cease to sin, a doctrine known as Christian perfection or entire sanctification. The doctrine of Christian perfection is sometimes accused of being a mask for pride, in the sense that no one could believe in, seek, or testify to entire sanctification—at least not one's own entire sanctification—without suffering from the sin of pride. In this paper, I examine Thomas Aquinas’ account of pride and consider whether that account indicates any problems for Wesley's doctrine of Christian perfection. I will argue that we can plausibly interpret Aquinas' account of pride in two main ways and that neither interpretation reveals pride to be a necessary failing of a person who seeks, experiences, or testifies to Wesley's entire sanctification (or any component thereof). Pride-based criticisms of Wesley's account of Christian perfection do properly highlight the special pride-based temptations that those who pursue a state of perfect love will need to resist, but nothing about the nature of pride, the particular elements of Christian perfection, or the pursuit, testimony, or achievement of any of those elements implies falling to such temptations.

Luís Pinto de Sá, "Turning Oppy’s Parodies into a Case for Divine Simplicity"

Abstract: Oppy (1996) has offered several parodies of Anderson’s Gödelian ontological argument (1990). Gettings (1999) has claimed these parodies do not work since they are inconsistent with an axiom that must be added to Anderson’s proof on independent grounds. Oppy (2000) replied that “there is room for doubt whether Getting’s Axiom [...] is really part of Gödel’s argument – or [...] Anderson’s variation thereof” (p. 363). Moreover, Oppy maintains that the first of his attempted parodies does succeed against Anderson’s original argument so long as Gettings’s axiom is not included. Finally, since Oppy admits his second parody fails, he attempts a third, one which he believes is able to succeed in spite of both the incorporation of Getting’s axiom and the objections which had led to the failure of his second parody (ibid.).

I will show that Oppy’s first two claims are false by showing how Gettings’s axiom can be derived as a theorem from Anderson’s original axioms. I shall also argue that since Oppy’s third parody relies

on the assumption that none of the properties of a God-like@ being is entailed by all the rest, it can be recast as an argument for divine simplicity by merely shifting the negation operator."

Brandon Rickabaugh, "Cognitive Science, Explanatory Gap Seemings, and the Soul: Why Physicalism Still Seems False"

Abstract: The explanatory gap, our current inability to provide/comprehend an explanation of consciousness given physicalism, makes physicalism seem false to many. On various interpretations, the explanatory gap provides evidence against physicalism. Some take this as evidence in support of mind-body dualism. In response, cognitive scientists have recently defended a dual-process account (DPA): empirical evidence shows that belief in the soul in explanatory gap cases is produced by malfunctioning cognitive process, effectively rejecting the gap altogether. In analyzing this application of cognitive science, it is argued that the vague yet confident assumption that the sciences, especially neuroscience and cognitive science, are at odds with mind-body dualism. I offer two replies to DPA. In doing so I suggest understanding the explanatory gap in terms of evidential seemings, which shows some benefits of an experience-first philosophy of mind. First, I argue that explanatory gap seemings can provide Moorean facts, such that we know things about our mental states better than we know the premises of DPA. Secondly, I argue that DPA forces us to reject highly justified commonsense beliefs regarding consciousness attribution. Consequently, we can take the evidence of explanatory gap seemings as evidence against physicalism and in favor of the soul.

James Dominic Rooney, OP, "(How) Does God Have a Plan For You"

Abstract: W. Matthews Grant argues that it is possible to reconcile a strong theory of God's causal sovereignty with libertarian freedom by denying an assumption that God causes the acts of free creatures by means of some factor, property, or decree intrinsic to Himself. He therefore proposes an "Extrinsic Model" (EM) which denies God has any plans or decrees. There is, nevertheless, a problem with EM: I show how, on an orthodox Christian account of grace, EM entails theological determinism. This is because EM cannot appeal to anything other than God's essence or the creature's act as that 'in virtue of which' God causes that free act. If, however, God gives grace to cause free acts in virtue of His intentions (divine decrees), God can be responsive to creatures and grace not logically sufficient to determine their actions. I will conclude by pointing out how classical theories of grace avoid determinism.

Jannai Shields, "Terminating Fundamental Determinables"

Abstract: Two conditions traditionally ascribed to the determinate-determinable relation are the following: 1) Determinables are related to determinates in that instances of determinables must be accompanied by one, and only one, instance of their determinates at a location and time, and 2) determinates are always more fundamental than their associated determinables. In a series of papers, Jessica Wilson attempts to undermine these two conditions, which prepares the way for her determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy. I build a case against her arguments, which ultimately leaves her determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy unmotivated.

Daniel Simpson, "Shared Liturgical Lament"

Abstract: Liturgical scripts call for a wide variety of joint actions--praising God, confessing sins, and thanking God for his mercy. But do they ever call for shared emotional states? They do, and the case of liturgical lament is a vivid case in point. The purpose of this paper is to sketch the contours of a larger account I am developing called 'shared liturgical lament'. I will begin by locating the phenomenon of shared liturgical lament in St. Augustine's sermons on the Psalms, and I will raise some questions about this phenomenon. Then I will note various strands in Terence Cuneo's recent work on Christian liturgy concerning liturgical singing and reenactment, which are of particular interest for my account. I then tie these strands together and expand Cuneo's insights in order to begin to develop an account of shared liturgical lament. On the account proposed here, shared liturgical lament is a collective action of singing and feeling, whereby the participants attend to one another's experiences within the performance, respond to another's emotional states by sharing in the same emotional content, and unite together in their address to God in order to bear another's burdens and cry for help in time of trouble.

Kevin Snider, "The Nature of Temptation"

Abstract: This paper attempts to explicate the nature of temptation by offering an intensive definition and the necessary conditions for an agent to experience temptation. This account builds on previous, but sparse, philosophical work on the topic. As understood here, temptation is, most basically, a conflict of desire. As such, the concept on offer here implicitly works to distinguish temptation from akrasia or weakness of will.

William Vincent, "A Puzzle of Bodily Assumption"

Abstract: In this paper I present a puzzle for the doctrine of bodily assumption:

(1) Certain bodies have entered into a heavenly state.

For Christians, broadly speaking, the most notable case of bodily assumption is the Ascension of Jesus in Acts. In addition, Catholics believe that subsequent to her death, the Holy Mother was assumed. And furthermore orthodox Jews have held to this doctrine also. For in the book of Kings it is recorded that Elijah was bodily assumed into heaven.

The puzzle is as follows:

(2) For all x, if x is in a heavenly state, then x is immaterial.

(3) Necessarily, for all x, if x is not spatial, then x is not a body.

(4) Necessarily, for all x, if x is immaterial, then x is not spatial.

From (2) through (4) it follows that

(5) For all x, if x is in a heavenly state, then x is not a body.

Contra (1). How to resolve this puzzle?

I respond to what I consider the most obvious solution to the puzzle: reject (2). I think this solution is mistaken, and I give three arguments in response to it.

Josh White, "Communal Influence, Cognitive Penetration, and Rational Religious Belief"

Abstract: A common objection to religious belief claims that the communal dependence of such belief is epistemically problematic. In the first part of this paper, I formulate a new version of this objection in terms of illicit cognitive penetration. One's community causes one to have mental states that cognitively penetrate the experiences or seemings on which one's religious beliefs are based, and this cognitive penetration is bad because it means that one's religious beliefs are not responsive to the religious facts (as they should be), but are instead responsive to facts about the community of which one is a part.

In the second part of the paper, I consider a way in which a Christian theist can respond to this form of the objection from communal influence. Specifically, the theist can respond that while the experiences or seemings that justify her theistic belief are the result of communal influence, they are not merely the result of communal influence. Rather, those seemings and experiences are also responsive to the workings of Holy Spirit. As such, they are responsive to the relevant religious facts.

Scott Williams, "Horrendous-Difference Disabilities, Resurrected Saints, and the Beatific Vision: A Theodicy"

Abstract: Marilyn Adams rightly pointed out that there are many kinds of evil, some of which are horrendous evils. I claim that one species of horrendous evils are what I call horrendous-difference disabilities. By 'horrendous-difference disabilities' I mean the conjunction of the following three items: an individual (i) has an intrinsic impediment to a certain kind of human function F, and (ii) has an extrinsic impediment such that she has no external aids for having function F, and (iii) the individual rationally wishes and significantly desires to have F for the purpose of overall well-being. I develop Adams's theodicy by appealing to certain features of Aquinas's account of the beatific vision and certain claims by Augustine about martyred saints in order to show how God might defeat this species of horrendous evil. Further, I raise an objection from Elizabeth Barnes's work on disability and another from L.A. Paul's work on the rationality of transformative experience, and reply to them.